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Give a man a fish, he’ll eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, 
she, her husband, her children, and her extended family will eat 
for a lifetime.
—Bono, New York Times (2005) 
Microcredit is not the “silver bullet” to end poverty.
—Jomo Sundaram, U.N. assistant secretary-general for economic 
development (2010) 
WHAT IS A MIRACLE? 
A majority of the world’s impoverished people lack adequate 
access to fi nancial services. Typically, formal banks do not target the 
poor because lending without collateral is considered too risky. Poor 
households seeking credit are consequently forced into informal mar-
kets where the prices are high, the quantities limited, and the methods 
of ensuring repayment can be brutal.
Since the poor arguably need liquidity more than anyone else, their 
impaired credit access is especially concerning. They face high levels of 
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risk and have almost no savings buffer, which means that small income 
shocks can generate huge consequences for their well-being. Further-
more, the majority are engaged in some form of self-employment, and 
entrepreneurship often requires signifi cant capital up front. The limited 
availability of formal savings instruments makes accumulating savings 
more diffi cult for the poor to do than for their richer counterparts. For 
all of these reasons, the rapid emergence of microfi nance institutions 
(MFIs) providing banking services to poor individuals in low-income 
countries was believed to be a potentially powerful tool for poverty 
alleviation.
Has microfi nance delivered on this promise? Perhaps the most chal-
lenging aspect of navigating the discourse surrounding microfi nance 
has been the roller coaster of exuberance and disillusionment (see the 
epigraphs above). Today, the general belief is that “microfi nance is not 
a miracle.” While we, as researchers who have been long involved in 
the study of microfi nance, certainly support a more pragmatic perspec-
tive, the excessive optimism we have seen does raise another question: 
What is humanity’s best example of a “miracle” intervention?
While there may be others, the discovery of penicillin and the sub-
sequent development of antibiotics is a likely contender. One estimate 
places antibiotics’ impact on average life expectancy at between 2 and 
10 years (McDermott 1982). Yet achieving this level of impact took 
decades. In the case of penicillin, Sir Alexander Fleming made his 
initial discovery in 1928, but it was not until 1945—almost 20 years 
later—that mass production and distribution began (Aminov 2010). 
This intervening period was fi lled with years of iterations, attempts, 
failures, intermediate successes, and a little serendipity: the penicil-
lin strain ultimately found to have the best properties for commercial 
production came from a moldy cantaloupe in an Illinois fruit market 
(Aldridge, Parascandola, and Sturchio 1999). Despite these efforts, the 
specter of drug-resistant bacteria was not far behind. Roughly three 
decades after penicillin’s discovery in a petri dish containing strains of 
Staphylococcus aureus, an estimated 25 percent of community-based 
strains of the bacterium were resistant to penicillin (Chambers 2001). 
Our advantage in this continually evolving challenge has only been 
maintained through corresponding improvements in antibiotics or other 
supporting technologies.
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Our experience with penicillin and antibiotics provides three critical 
lessons about “magic bullets.” First, the development of such products 
is far from miraculous, but rather refl ects years of research and develop-
ment. Second, the application of a miracle cure may be remarkably con-
strained—antibiotic “miracle drugs” are only effective when their use 
is well-defi ned, targeted, and consistently applied. Third, maintaining 
the miracle is a dynamic process—continuous innovation is required to 
prolong the effectiveness of these “magic bullets.”
Given this framework, some of the successes of microcredit are 
truly impressive. Microcredit began in the 1970s as a community-based 
antipoverty campaign predominantly targeting women. This campaign 
stood in opposition to the belief that the world’s poor were incapable 
of supporting credit (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009). The 
Global Microcredit Summit 2011 Report estimated that by that year, 
microcredit had reached 195 million people across the globe, many of 
whom previously had lacked any kind of formal fi nancial access (Reed 
2013). Over the past two decades, microcredit has become a key mech-
anism for providing credit to poor microentrepreneurs. Its impressive 
scale is rivaled perhaps only by its surprisingly low default rates. Pro-
ducing global default assessments gives rise to a number of problems 
stemming from varying defi nitions and differences in reporting. How-
ever, it is common to see MFIs report default rates of around 2 percent. 
From this perspective, the rapidity, scale, and scope of microcredit is 
real, and its success is remarkable.
Yet the reality of microcredit still has failed to match the lofty expec-
tations for it. Critics have denounced the sector for failing to reach the 
poorest and most remote among potential clients. A typical MFI client 
is “working poor” rather than destitute. There has also been substantial 
controversy over alleged excessive pressure on clients to repay, and 
the industry is often criticized for exploiting the poor by encouraging 
them to take on high-interest-rate debt.1 Perhaps most damning, there 
is limited evidence that access to microcredit, in its current form, is 
associated with reductions in poverty through microentrepreneurship 
(Banerjee 2013).
However, if we return to the problem-framing afforded by the anti-
biotics experience, then a different narrative emerges: namely, that the 
limited impacts on poverty that current microfi nance products are hav-
ing does not make them purely failures, but rather critical lessons capa-
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ble of helping us redesign microcredit to better serve the poor. Given 
this perspective, one such lesson is that fi nancial services for the poor 
can succeed when products provide the means for insuring clients while 
those clients undertake high-return but risky activities. Arguably, ele-
ments of microfi nance that help provide greater insurance while relax-
ing credit constraints may be the most important for creating a signifi -
cant impact.
In this chapter, we develop this view further, with lessons gleaned 
from our portfolio of research on the microfi nance sector in India. We 
begin by providing background on the emergence and current design of 
microfi nance and by explaining its theoretical underpinnings. We go on 
to highlight several points of promise: areas where our own empirical 
research suggests ways in which the delivery of microfi nance might be 
changed to increase its impact on poverty and microenterprise growth. 
In particular, results from a series of fi eld experiments that we con-
ducted with MFIs in India demonstrate that it is possible to make micro-
fi nance work better for the poor with a few small changes to the exist-
ing model. Based on these studies, we explore different ways in which 
the microcredit experience can be tailored to improve targeting of key 
development outcomes.
THE IDEA OF MICROFINANCE 
Microfi nance began as an attempt to address a perceived poverty 
trap: poor households, because of a lack of collateral, were unable to 
access formal loans, but without credit they could not accumulate assets 
to be used as collateral. Microfi nance sought to end this cycle by pro-
viding small loans—microcredit—without the typical asset require-
ments by harnessing social rather than physical collateral. In particular, 
by requiring new clients to have social ties to existing clients, MFIs 
could better select “good” clients (because those clients more likely 
to be invited by existing group members are more likely to repay) and 
also incentivize repayment because of the threat of losing or damaging 
one’s social ties to group members in cases of default. In this sense, in 
a microcredit contract, social links are able to serve much the same pur-
pose as physical collateral does in a standard loan contract.
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The initial success of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank with social col-
lateral–based loans inspired the fi rst wave of MFIs, largely consisting 
of nonprofi t organizations providing loans to self-selected “joint lia-
bility groups” (JLGs). Each JLG member, typically female, received a 
loan “secured” by the social ties and shared responsibility of the entire 
group. If one group member defaulted, then the entire group was penal-
ized. These loans were of reasonably short duration (3 to 10 months) 
and had relatively high interest rates (30–40 percent). Loan repayment 
usually took place at regular weekly meetings between JLG members 
and a loan offi cer; the meetings began a week or two after loan disbursal.
This “Grameen Bank approach” appeared to offer an attractive 
model. Taking advantage of the local knowledge of fellow JLG members 
enabled institutions to screen out the worst credit risks prior to group 
formation. If an individual member was delinquent with repayments, 
then group members could apply social pressure to end delinquency or, 
in the case of those truly unable to pay, serve as informed guarantors 
and repay the delinquent funds themselves. From an MFI operations 
perspective, the JLG structure also reduced monitoring costs.2
Today, microfi nance has expanded to encompass a range of fi nan-
cial products and services.3 Under this umbrella are nearly countless 
variations of savings, insurance, credit, and other fi nancial offerings 
aimed at improving the well-being of urban and rural clients. Even 
early innovators like the Grameen Bank continue to develop and 
expand their offerings. The “Grameen Bank II” experience blends the 
structure and discipline of the original model with more breadth and 
greater fl exibility.4 The notion that microcredit is simply “loans for the 
poor” misses how signifi cantly these products have evolved since their 
initial introduction.
Another iconic Indian microfi nance pioneer, the Self-Employed 
Women’s Association Bank (SEWA Bank), adopts a similarly broad 
perspective. Targeting poor women working in the informal sector, 
SEWA Bank seeks to address a client’s entire life cycle of potential 
fi nancial needs. Every client has a savings account and access to a vari-
ety of structured investment, pension, insurance, and credit products 
(although strong emphasis is placed on the importance of saving).5
These early innovators are not the only organizations updating their 
offerings.
Ch2Field.indd   15 11/4/2016   12:45:03 PM
16   Field, Holland, and Pande
As observed by Karlan and Zinman (2009, p. 3), the microcredit 
industry has developed a “second generation,” distinguished by “for-
profi t lenders, extending individual liability credit, in increasingly 
urban and competitive settings.” Arguably, this distinction is not sim-
ply cosmetic, but rather refl ects the fact that evidence on whether the 
joint liability structure is, itself, important remains mixed (Banerjee 
2013). Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) analyze data from 
the Microfi nance Information Exchange on 346 institutions employing 
an assortment of individual and group liability models. They report that 
organizations offering individual versus group liability loans “have the 
highest average profi t levels but they perform least well on measures of 
outreach” (p. F109). Meanwhile, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
in the Philippines in which the joint liability structure was removed ran-
domly from a set of loan groups (but the group structure remained oth-
erwise intact) revealed no increase in delinquency or default, according 
to Karlan and Zinman.
Although much of microfi nance’s success has been in demonstrat-
ing the possibility of providing loans to the poor without incurring inor-
dinate fi nancial risk, evaluating the ability of such loans to improve the 
socioeconomic well-being of poor households is a critical part of the 
product development process. Prior to making such an evaluation, it is 
important to review the evidence on two issues. First, do poor house-
holds have access to profi table investment opportunities? If yes, this 
raises a second issue: are poor households constrained in their ability 
to accumulate funds? If so, this may be because they are destitute and 
have no spare cash to save or no place to put it aside secure from other 
household or community members—or from their own temptation.
Experimental studies such as de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 
(2008) use randomized cash grants to small Sri Lankan enterprises 
and report real returns to capital of between 55 and 65 percent a year. 
While research in this area is certainly ongoing (Berge, Bjorvatn, and 
Tungodden 2011; Karlan et al. 2014; McKenzie and Woodruff 2008), 
there is enough evidence to suggest that our foundational assumption 
of access to profi table opportunities is not unreasonable for the aver-
age microentrepreneur and may be particularly true for men (de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009).
In terms of whether microcredit client households are destitute, the 
Global Microcredit Summit 2011 Report indicates that only 63 per-
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cent of microfi nance households can be characterized as coming from 
“extreme poverty,” defi ned as living on less than $1.25 a day (Reed 
2013). Furthermore, even those in extreme poverty are likely to have 
the capacity to save. Banerjee and Dufl o (2007) utilize detailed house-
hold surveys across 13 countries to gain an in-depth perspective on the 
fi nancial lives of the poor (those living on less than $2.16 a day) and the 
extremely poor (those living on less than $1.08 a day). Contrary to what 
one might expect, even the extremely poor are clearly not spending all 
of their money on basic needs, as their spending on food ranges between 
56 and 78 percent of household income. While it is certainly reason-
able that other, nonfood expenses could be very important, spending on 
alcohol, tobacco, and festivals typically makes up a meaningful part of 
the remaining budget as well.
Studies on returns to savings products by Dupas and Robinson 
(2013) simultaneously support the view that poor households have the 
capacity to save and highlight the constraints they face that make it 
diffi cult to save. More recent evidence shows that, like the rich, the 
poor often exhibit time-inconsistent preferences. In addition, a high 
incidence of health shocks in this population greatly increases the need 
for easily accessible savings.
Microcredit’s success at reducing poverty also depends on the 
degree to which microloans are used to fi nance investment. Looking 
across studies in three countries, Morduch (2013) observes that micro-
loan usage is almost evenly split between business investment and other 
objectives. While these latter purchases could be welfare-improving 
(examples include fi nancing household expenses and paying down 
debt), they are not likely to effect a quick and permanent exodus from 
poverty.
Given the evidence on savings and credit opportunities in particu-
lar, microloans should have the capacity to help many clients speed up 
the rate of asset acquisition, thus initiating the climb out of poverty. 
Nevertheless, a review of seven recent experimental studies reveals 
no evidence of microcredit leading to sustained increases in income 
or consumption.6 When microbusinesses are affected by microcredit 
access, it generally appears to be on the intensive rather than exten-
sive margin; i.e., improvements are seen with existing businesses, not 
from new business creation. Only two studies, Augsburg et al. (2012) 
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and Banerjee et al. (2013), demonstrate statistically signifi cant positive 
effects on business creation.
Within existing businesses, it does appear that microcredit facilitates 
business investment, and in some cases this translates into increases in 
revenue. Unfortunately, all studies with the exception of Crépon et al. 
(2011) and Banerjee et al. (2013) fail to identify positive effects on prof-
its at standard signifi cance levels, and in both exceptions the impacts 
are concentrated in subpopulations.7
Another outcome often emphasized by the microcredit narrative 
is female empowerment. However, most studies report no effect on 
traditional empowerment measures. One exception is Angelucci, Kar-
lan, and Zinman (2013), who fi nd statistically signifi cant but relatively 
small increases in the likelihood that the female household member will 
participate in household decision making. However, we should note an 
important caveat: unlike business profi ts, which have a clear monetary 
defi nition, defi nitions of female empowerment may be context-specifi c, 
and reporting may be subject to social desirability concerns. To date, 
most papers rely on clients’ self-reported survey responses.8
ENHANCING THE IMPACT OF MICROCREDIT 
Despite indications that microcredit has relatively weak impacts 
on traditional socioeconomic measures, there are many reasons to hold 
out hope that microcredit products can be modifi ed to enhance their 
effects on business investment and poverty. In particular, evidence from 
several studies that we conducted in India suggests multiple ways to 
improve microfi nance through design. The research also points to alter-
native measures (aside from profi t) to judge microfi nance’s success or 
failure. So how can we make microfi nance more relevant to the poor?
The following subsections highlight fi ve points of promise, areas 
where the research suggests ways to enhance or better understand the 
impact of microfi nance on a variety of important development outcomes. 
These include building more fl exibility into the microfi nance contract, 
directly encouraging greater business investment, using microfi nance 
to build social capital, anticipating and measuring a broader range of 
development outcomes, and focusing more on the rural population.
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Build Flexibility into the Microfi nance Contract 
There is increasing evidence that typical microcredit contract 
designs restrict the ways in which the poor use loan funds. Interestingly, 
many of today’s microcredit arrangements bear little resemblance to 
loans offered by organizations such as the U.S. Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA), which are also designed, ostensibly, to support the kind 
of entrepreneurial risk-taking necessary for success. As pointed out by 
Glennon and Nigro (2005), these loans typically have fi xed monthly 
(or less frequent) repayment schedules and a grace period between the 
initial loan disbursement and the beginning of repayment. The default 
rate on SBA loans is also rather high—between 13 and 15 percent. On 
this point, the gap between microcredit loans and SBA loans is stark; in 
one study by Field, Pande, et al. (2013), the default rates for individual-
liability microloans in India were around 2 percent.
From a theoretical perspective, introducing grace periods or decreas-
ing repayment frequency may increase a microentrepreneur’s ability to 
self-insure. In more concrete terms, this would mean that a particularly 
bad performance one week could be offset by improvements the next. 
Alternatively, if a microentrepreneur knows she won’t be able to make 
a payment on time by herself, she has more time to mobilize additional 
support to avoid default, or is less likely to need to liquidate business 
assets in order to make bank payments on time.
In a recent study, we use a fi eld experiment to investigate directly 
the effect on business outcomes and household income of introducing 
a two-month grace period into the structure of an individual-liability 
microcredit agreement (Field, Jayachandran, et al. 2013). Introducing 
such a grace period has an immediate and positive effect: the rate of 
new business formation doubles, and a greater portion of the loan is 
invested into the business. What is more surprising is that the effect on 
poverty is even more impressive: three years on, household income is 
17 percent higher and business profi ts nearly double. Interestingly, the 
default rate on these loans increases from 2 percent to roughly 10 per-
cent, still below the 13–15 percent experienced by companies receiving 
SBA loans, but a healthy indicator that microentrepreneurs indeed are 
taking greater risks when microcredit agreements allow them to do so.
A companion study explored the impact of switching from weekly 
to monthly repayment frequency (Field et al. 2012). The change more 
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than doubled business income, increased household income by 84–88 
percent, and caused no increase in the default rate during the study 
period. In what could be a proverbial “win-win” situation, the same 
study found that clients were 51 percent less likely to report feeling 
“worried, tense, or anxious” and 54 percent more likely to report feeling 
confi dent about repaying.
These results suggest that there is signifi cant leeway in how to 
enhance microcredit’s effectiveness by making simple changes to con-
tract design. In particular, products providing more fl exible capital, 
loosening the credit constraint, and increasing the borrower’s ability to 
self-insure appear to effectively boost the entrepreneurial capacity of 
poor clients. However, these results do come with an important caveat: 
the higher default rates associated with more fl exible contracts present a 
signifi cant obstacle to for-profi t MFIs, particularly in settings in which 
loan terms and interest rates are heavily regulated.
Organizations like SBA enjoy substantial subsidies, but the politi-
cal appetite for subsidizing private-sector MFIs may be limited. One 
approach could be to improve MFIs’ ability to assess the risk of individ-
ual applicants. Credit bureaus are one such mechanism for doing so, as 
they provide lending organizations with a way to independently verify a 
potential borrower’s fi nancial capacity. In this way, credit bureaus alle-
viate some of the customer screening burden and enable MFIs to offer 
products tailored to the needs and capabilities of individual clients.
A key complementary lesson is the importance of not overregulat-
ing interest rates. That is, greater fl exibility will generally only be pos-
sible if banks are allowed to charge higher interest rates to compensate 
for associated changes in lending risk. Constraining rates at artifi cially 
low levels may prevent MFIs from offering a menu of products catering 
to specifi c client needs, and thereby prevent MFI clients from “buying” 
more fl exible loan contracts. Those seeking to protect the interests of 
the poor through microfi nance regulation must be particularly careful 
on this front. Empirical research suggests that more limitations on lend-
ers are likely to restrict their ability to get the lending model right.
Encourage Investment Directly 
As stipulated by the Grameen Bank lending model, MFIs main-
tain high levels of interaction with their clients for purposes of loan 
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monitoring. This suggests that MFIs are also well placed to disseminate 
information and training effi ciently, potentially enhancing clients’ use 
of microcredit. In particular, MFIs that follow the Grameen Bank model 
and interact regularly with clients have the potential to increase the like-
lihood that a particular client will take up a loan and increase the use to 
which loan funds are applied. One simple model for conceptualizing the 
role of fi nancial literacy or business training in generating profi ts is that 
of perfect complements (Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden 2011). In this 
framework, training can help increase profi ts only to the degree that the 
skills of the entrepreneur are the binding constraint. Once other factors, 
such as social norms or access to further credit, become the limiting fac-
tor, training must be suitably modifi ed for it to have an impact.
Consistent with this framework, training programs that focus on 
conveying relatively basic, relevant, and concise content have seen 
signifi cant results. Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2014) conducted an 
RCT that found that teaching clients “rules of thumb” outperformed a 
more traditional fi nancial literacy training program, showing substan-
tial effects on sales (improvements of 30 percent or more) during bad 
weeks. Another experimental evaluation of training in simple practices, 
Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2011), found signifi cant impacts 
of business training on profi ts, between 25 and 30 percent, but these 
impacts were limited to male microentrepreneurs. No impacts were 
observed among women.
Still, many other studies fi nd no signifi cant effects on what arguably 
is the most important business outcome, profi ts. Using an experimental 
design in Ghana, Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2012) engage microen-
trepreneurs with combinations of cash grants and business consulting 
services. Despite the rather intensive nature of this tailored manage-
ment guidance, they fi nd no evidence that the effort increases profi ts. 
The authors also conduct a short review of 10 other papers examining 
the effects of business training. Variations in business circumstance and 
training methods aside, only 3 of the 10 show statistically signifi cant 
positive effects on profi ts.
In the context of fi ndings like these, one possibility for improve-
ment is to help ensure more supportive environments for entrepreneur-
ship outside the classroom, particularly for women, since many cultures 
consider work, especially risky entrepreneurial ventures, inappropriate 
for women. To shed light on some of these factors, Field, Jayachandran, 
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et al. (2013) undertook an experimental analysis of a two-day business 
counseling program for female business owners. Half of the clients tar-
geted by the training were invited to bring a friend. The counseling pro-
gram also focused on assisting attendees in identifying and developing 
a plan to achieve a medium-term fi nancial goal (one feasibly attainable 
in under six months).
Despite explicitly discouraging the women from acquiring debt, the 
training experience doubled the likelihood that a woman would take 
out a loan, and loan size refl ected the woman’s stated goals. Women 
who attended with a friend were more than twice as likely to take out a 
business loan as they were to take out a loan to fund nonbusiness goals 
such as home improvement or education. Upon follow-up, women who 
attended the training with a friend reported 11 percent higher household 
incomes and 15 percent higher expenditures, while those who attended 
by themselves were still indistinguishable from the control group. 
Interestingly, increased business investment did not translate into 
higher defaults; both treatment groups had similarly low default levels. 
Finally, among women trained with friends, the economic effects were 
particularly pronounced for women who faced more social restrictions, 
such as more conservative caste or religious constraints (also see Field, 
Jayachandran, and Pande 2010).
Use Microfi nance to Build Social Capital 
Social capital has traditionally underpinned the design of microfi -
nance products.9 In the face of inevitable setbacks and adverse events, 
informal insurance networks supported by social capital may be a criti-
cal source of support for microentrepreneurs. Indeed, such social capi-
tal formation may be a key reason the group-lending model can reduce 
default risk. Recent research has continued to explore this area and has 
highlighted how the group meetings themselves, rather than simply 
group liability, may build social capital directly.
One study, Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013), uses a random-
ized experiment in the city of Kolkata (formerly Calcutta), India, to 
examine the infl uence of microfi nance meetings on social capital and 
the resulting ability of social networks to provide informal insurance. 
Clients in this experiment were offered individual-liability loans but 
were required to meet to repay the loans in groups, either on a weekly 
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or a monthly basis. Increased interaction associated with weekly meet-
ings led to a lasting change in the degree of social connections between 
group members well beyond the loan cycle. In the short run, clients 
saw one another outside meetings signifi cantly more often, and these 
effects persisted two years later. Even after a large fraction of the groups 
had stopped meeting for loan purposes, those who had met weekly as 
opposed to monthly during their fi rst loan cycle were signifi cantly more 
likely to remain in regular contact with fellow group members and state 
that they could rely on one another in cases of emergency.
Furthermore, clients assigned to the weekly meetings were three 
times less likely to default on their subsequent loan, irrespective of 
payment frequency. Employing a second arm of the same experiment, 
the study used an artifactual game to isolate what appears to be driv-
ing this effect: improved risk pooling. Added to that, the more intense 
social interaction between microcredit group members appears not to 
“crowd out” a borrower’s nonmicrocredit social network, indicating 
that the microcredit experience may play an important role in improv-
ing the resilience of microentrepreneurs in the face of inevitable fi nan-
cial shocks and setbacks, even without the additional constraint of joint 
liability.
Beyond this, more recent research indicates that the frequency with 
which meetings are held matters not only for fi rst-time clients, as was 
demonstrated in Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013), but also for cli-
ents who have been together for at least two previous loan cycles. In 
particular, a similar RCT, in which third-time borrowers were random-
ized into weekly versus monthly meetings, shows that social capital 
is signifi cantly higher among the weekly groups, despite the fact that 
group members already know one another at the outset of the loan cycle 
(Feigenberg et al. 2014). According to these results, regular microfi -
nance meetings can continue to stimulate social contact among group 
members for several years.
A related result is found in Karlan and Zinman (2009); the authors 
employ an RCT design in Manila, the Philippines, that randomly 
assigns access to individual liability microcredit loans to the marginal 
applicant. On balance, they fi nd that microcredit appears to increase the 
amount individuals are able to borrow from their social networks in an 
emergency.
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While direct comparison of these fi ndings is diffi cult given the dif-
ference in settings and loan products, the key message for microfi nance 
policy is more general: to maximize the economic impact of providing 
microcredit, it makes sense to focus on a delivery model that encour-
ages social interaction. Social capital appears to be stimulated in signifi -
cant and economically meaningful ways by regular microfi nance meet-
ings. While the group-lending model may be favored for other reasons, 
it is reasonable to infer that at least some of its success is a result of the 
relationships between borrowers fostered by regular meetings.
Based on this evidence, it makes sense not only to continue with the 
group-lending model, particularly with respect to new borrowers, but 
also to target microfi nance toward clients who are particularly socially 
isolated. These results also suggest that women in socially restrictive 
settings may be of particular importance in understanding the potential 
effects of microcredit/microfi nance as a development intervention, a 
topic we will discuss below.
Anticipate (and Measure) the Effect of Microfi nance on Other 
Development Goals 
One reason to hold out hope that microfi nance can deliver on its 
promise of reducing poverty is the relative youth of the sector and 
the supporting experimental research: many of the potential channels 
through which the poor could benefi t are arguably indirect and long-
term, and hence have not been rigorously assessed by existing impact 
evaluations.
Perhaps most notably, the gendered aspect of the traditional micro-
fi nance model—which caters exclusively to female clients—has led 
to claims that microloans have the potential to empower women by 
increasing their bargaining power within the household.10 Increasing 
female bargaining power, in turn, has the potential to reduce poverty 
through several channels, including increasing rates of human capi-
tal accumulation (e.g., Thomas [1990], [1994]) and reducing fertility. 
While theoretically possible, it is not obvious that increasing house-
hold debt levels in female members’ names will lead to greater female 
fi nancial control, as MFI loan funds are generally used for household 
businesses and consumption.
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To evaluate this claim empirically, Field, Pande, and Martinez 
(2015) conducted a study of female clients in Ahmedabad, India, who 
had received access to credit through one of the fi rst microfi nance 
institutions in the world, SEWA Bank. The study follows a sample of 
clients with SEWA Bank savings accounts from 1999 to 2009. Over 
this decade, about half of these women took out loans from SEWA 
Bank. We make use of quasi-experimental variation in the placement 
of SEWA loan offi cers (female employees who collect payments door-
to-door and receive commissions on loans) in order to account for sys-
tematic differences between those who do and those do not seek credit. 
This enables us to identify the causal effect of access to microloans on 
household fi nancial and demographic outcomes. The intuition behind 
this empirical approach is the following: Within a four-block radius, 
women that live on the same block as the loan offi cer have virtually 
identical fi nances, according to observable measures, as those who live 
slightly farther away. Yet those who live slightly farther away are much 
less likely to take out a loan over the decade. The distance of one’s resi-
dence to that of the neighborhood loan offi cer arguably provides a valid 
source of exogenous variation in access to credit.
Similar to other impact evaluations of microfi nance, this study also 
fi nds that access to microcredit is associated with no change in house-
hold income or business profi ts. However, there is a large and signifi -
cant increase in the household’s fraction of income earned by women 
and in female labor force participation. Most notably, access to credit 
is also associated with a signifi cant reduction in fertility and a signif-
icant increase in the marriage age of daughters, which suggests that 
increasing women’s earning potential increases their bargaining power 
within the household. In the long run, the social and economic benefi ts 
of reductions in unwanted births may contribute to signifi cant improve-
ments in the lives of the poor.
Focus on the Rural Population
One of the greatest shortcomings of existing evidence on microfi -
nance impacts is that virtually all evaluations take place in urban set-
tings. Meanwhile, given the substantial differences between urban and 
rural areas, it seems reasonable to expect that there will be different 
constraints limiting microentrepreneurs in these two environments. 
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One common assumption is that the rural poor face far greater credit 
constraints. While studies like Crépon et al. (2011) certainly fi nd a near 
vacuum of credit access in rural Morocco, other studies discover levels 
of credit access analogous to urban areas. Attanasio et al. (2011) fi nd 
that more than 60 percent of rural Mongolian residents have at least one 
outstanding loan prior to their introduction to microcredit. Similarly, 
Banerjee et al. (2013) determine that 68 percent of urban residents in 
Hyderabad, India, have some kind of formal or informal loan at base-
line.11 Given this picture, it is not immediately apparent that the defi ning 
characteristic of the urban-versus-rural divide is simply access to credit.
Karlan et al. (2014) consider an alternative perspective: that the con-
straining factor in rural environments may be uninsured risk rather than 
credit constraints. Using a fi eld experiment, they randomly assigned 
cash grants and rainfall insurance offerings over multiple years and 
found signifi cant positive effects of insurance on investment in agricul-
tural inputs. While the authors’ particular point estimates will vary with 
realized weather outcomes, the immediate results can tell us something 
about the relative cost-effectiveness of cash grants (i.e., free money) 
versus rainfall insurance. Their results note that “the cost of the rain-
fall insurance is an order of magnitude less than the cost of the capital 
grant, whereas the consequential behavior change is an order of magni-
tude more. Hence the cost-effectiveness is unambiguous and striking: 
if using subsidy money to generate higher farm investments, rainfall 
insurance grants are far more cost-effective than cash grants” (p. 628). 
Another important aspect of their fi ndings highlights a central role 
MFIs may play in enhancing the impact of rainfall insurance. As noted 
by Karlan et al. (2014), a signifi cant hurdle for greater adoption of insur-
ance is lack of trust between the farmer and the insurance underwriter. 
Compared to traditional fi nancial organizations, MFIs have far greater 
access to and familiarity with impoverished rural communities. While 
strategies will certainly vary, the microcredit group experience may be 
a scalable mechanism for fostering greater trust through educating bor-
rowers as well as sharing experiences among clients.
Calderón, Cunha, and De Giorgi (2013) reinforce the potential value 
of MFIs as a platform for disseminating knowledge and training in 
rural areas. The authors employ an RCT design in evaluating an inten-
sive six-week, 48-hour business literacy training program for female 
business owners. The training program created statistically signifi cant 
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increases in profi ts and revenues by roughly 23 and 28 percent, respec-
tively.12 Business practices also changed as microentrepreneurs adopted 
improved accounting techniques and became increasingly likely to for-
mally register their businesses. At least some of these practices proved 
contagious, as untreated businesses in treatment areas also adopted 
better accounting techniques. These results have also been proven to 
be rather persistent: statistically signifi cant effects are still detectable 
more than two years after treatment. While this research focuses on 
the impact of the training program, it is important to note that business 
owners also reported having access to additional capital. Thus, these 
results are potentially subject to the availability of credit.
In summary, protection against risk and improvements in human 
capital appear to yield signifi cant returns in rural areas. Microcredit 
may also have an explicit complementary effect, as tested by Karlan 
et al. (2014) with the use of cash grants. Keeping this in mind, the role 
of rural MFIs becomes particularly important. With appropriate design, 
MFIs can offer precisely the sustainable and scalable platform neces-
sary to take advantage of these signifi cant and economically important 
effects.
CONCLUSION
We began this chapter by arguing that the lessons of a real example 
of a “magic bullet” can provide a useful framework for understanding 
the evolution and potential promise of microfi nance. With this perspec-
tive, we have experienced the same roller coaster of invention, failure, 
and reinvention as Sir Richard Fleming, who labored for years before 
penicillin’s eventual success. Similarly, current microfi nance research 
has identifi ed several points of promise for real, positive impact: adjust-
ments in microcredit agreement structure, improvements in business 
training, and changes in the social aspects of borrowing. Such promise 
confi rms the importance of creating a microfi nance experience that both 
encourages greater entrepreneurial risk-taking and improves microen-
trepreneurs’ ability to protect themselves against risk. As we have seen 
in results from rural areas, the role of MFIs as a sustainable and trusted 
platform for fi nancial inclusion may be particularly important for miti-
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gating risk. Some effects may also be indirect and longer-term, as could 
be the case for a variety of female empowerment outcomes.
The lessons learned from the penicillin “magic bullet” experience 
also carry a message for policymakers: effective regulation must be 
both smart and light-handed. Reactive policies may end up derailing the 
process of iteration and invention needed to deliver effective and effi -
cient fi nancial access to the poor. Yet research has also exposed ways 
in which policy could spur evolution in the sector. The formation of 
credit bureaus could increase the ability of microfi nance institutions to 
assess client credit risk, and regulation could encourage MFIs to offer 
a broader range of fi nancial products. These appear to be two ways in 
which informed policy could enhance the effectiveness of microfi nance 
organizations.
Notes
 1.  Examples include media attention to farmer suicides in India, which were blamed 
on microfi nance debt, and the larger 2010 default crisis in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, which led to calls for dramatic reforms to the already heavily regulated 
sector (Biswas 2010; Menon 2010).
 2.  Tracking and collecting loans in a group rather than at the individual level effec-
tively lowered the cost of administering small loans to poor households.
 3.  Much of the current research, as well as this review, focuses on a particular sub-
type of microfi nance, microcredit.
 4.  In addition to multiple potential individual-liability loan types, a Grameen client 
now has access to life insurance, savings accounts, and pension accounts. Even 
within a loan cycle, liquidity-strapped clients can access an additional line of 
credit based on the amounts previously paid on their current loans.
 5.  SEWA Bank also has strong linkages with its other sister SEWA institutions, pro-
viding access to union support, training, and housing services. This comprehen-
sive concern may be well justifi ed. In one nonexperimental study of 900 women 
from the SEWA Bank service area in Ahmedabad, 71 percent reported at least one 
signifi cant fi nancial shock over the two-year study period (Chen and Snodgrass 
2001).
 6.  Studies considered for this statement include Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 
(2013), Attanasio et al. (2011), Augsburg et al. (2012), Banerjee et al. (2013), 
Crépon et al. (2011), Giné and Mansuri (2011), and Karlan and Zinman (2009). 
 7.  In the case of Crépon et al. (2011), profi ts increase only in the agricultural house-
hold subsample. This appears to be driven by increased investments in hired farm-
hands. Banerjee et al. (2013) have even more nuanced fi ndings: benefi ts appear 
concentrated in the upper tail of microenterprises, with fi rms in the ninetieth per-
centile of profi tability seeing a 20 percent increase in profi ts, but only after three 
years of exposure to microcredit.
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 8.  In an example of just how diffi cult it can be to measure female empowerment, 
Beaman et al. (2009) exploited a government program that randomly reserved 
village council seats for female candidates in India. The authors employed a com-
bination of explicit and implicit tests to determine preferences regarding female 
elected offi cials. Implicit tests, those unlikely to be subject to social desirabil-
ity bias, indicated that both male and female villagers had strong preferences for 
leaders of their own gender. Simultaneously, when researchers solicited explicit 
perspectives, both men and women responded with preferences for male lead-
ers. The contradictory results among female villagers encapsulate the challenge in 
assessing progress in empowering women: stated responses may not be an accu-
rate measure.
 9.  For the purposes of this chapter, we apply Putnam’s defi nition of social capital: “fea-
tures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the 
effi ciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993).
 10.  In economics, intrahousehold bargaining power is generally about the ability of 
individual household members to assert their preferences over themselves or the 
entire household. Changing bargaining power has the potential to increase house-
hold well-being if the shift causes changes in household investment behavior. 
Thomas (1990) has published a classic treatise in this area.
 11.  This number should be treated with some degree of suspicion because of baseline 
implementation challenges.
 12.  These estimates refl ect the program’s intention-to-treat effect, which is a conser-
vative estimate of the program’s effect. The treatment-on-the-treated effect, or the 
effect on those that actually received the training, was 1.5 times larger.
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